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ABSTRACT 5th generation wireless systems are coming. While we are excited about the delay-free
high speeds 5G will bring, security problems are becoming more and more serious. Increasingly rampant
Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) attacks, particularly Distributed Reflection Denial of Service (DrDoS)
attacks with User Datagram Protocols (UDPs) have developed into a global problem. This article presents a
design, implementation, analysis, and experimental evaluation of an authentication scheme, a defense against
UDP DrDoS attacks, by which attackers cleverly use rebound server farms to bounce a flood of packets
to a target host. We call our solution IEWA because it combines the concepts of increasing expenses and
weak authentication. In this paper, we apply IEWA to Network Time Protocol (NTP). First, we simulate and
compare the original and improved protocols. Next, we verify the effectiveness of our proposed scheme.
We show that our improved scheme is safer than the original scheme. Finally, we compare our solution
with existing state-of-the-art schemes, using indicators such as communication overhead, server storage
costs, client storage costs, computation costs of server and computation costs of client. We find that our
scheme improves system stability and security, reduces communication overhead, server storage cost and
computational costs. Our solution not only improves the NTP protocol to mitigate DrDoS attacks, but also
strengthens other UDP protocols that are vulnerable to DrDoS attacks. Therefore, our solution can be used
as a solution to UDP DrDoS attacks in 5G Networks.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, distributed reflection denial of service (DrDoS), network time proto-
col (NTP), user datagram protocol (UDP), 5G.
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the increasingly prosperous development of the
Internet of things (IoT) [1], [2], intelligent services and
mobile services [3]–[5], the 5th generation wireless systems
(in short 5G) is coming gradually [6], [7]. Today, IoT and
5G are two of the biggest hypes in telecom [8], 5G brings us
higher speeds and lower latency [9], [10], but it also brings us
a cadre of security issues.
Several telecon insiders report that ‘‘Security is a top con-
cern for 5G operators, almost equal to increasing capacity and
throughput,’’ and ‘‘Opportunities and Challenges await a 5G
Connected Economy.’’Many industry leaders report that 94%
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Ilsun You .
of respondents expect the growth of 5G to increase security
and reliability concerns for 5G mobile operators [11].
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) [12] is considered
one of the most serious threats since it prevents the user from
gaining access to network services [13], [14]. The rollout
of 5G will almost certainly expand the trend of significant
increases in the largest attacks increasing significantly in size,
every year, to the point where we can surely expect the first
10 terabits per second attacks sometime soon [15]. Evenmore
frightening, the new advanced 5G network can be paralyzed
by someone renting DDoS-for-hire service for tens of dollars,
which exploit the power of botnets that they are unwittingly
providing the connectivity for [15]!
DDoS attacks have increased rapidly in both quantity and
severity within the last few years. Furthermore, there are
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TABLE 1. DDoS Attack Statistics, First Quarter Of 2018 [17].
four alarming Trends according to the Full Year 2018 DDoS
Trends Report [16]:
1) REPEAT ATTACKS
DDoS victims have a 1 in 5 chance (22%) of being attacked
again within 24 hours. There is a significant probability that
victims will suffer a repeat attack, causing more service
outages.
2) LOW-VOLUME ATTACKS DOMINATE
98% of Corero-mitigated DDoS attacks were less than
10Gbps. Low-volume attacks often go undetected and unmit-
igated by manual/legacy DDoS solutions.
3) MAJOR ATTACKS DOUBLED
100% Increase in DDoS attacks over 10Gbps.
The percentage of attacks over 10Gbps doubled in 2018
compared to 2017.
4) DAILY ATTACKS INCREASING
The average number of attacks per customer in 2018
increased 16% over 2017.
5) SHORT DURATION ATTACKS CONTINUE
Short duration attacks, which often go unmitigated by
traditional DDoS solutions, are increasingly common. 81%
in 2018 lasted less than 10 minutes, up from 71% in 2017.
A review of DDoS Amplification sources during
2018 reveals that the availability of vulnerable UDP servers
continues to be a worldwide problem. From [16] we can
see that different geographical locations host a variety of
amplifiers that can be harnessed by DDoS attackers from
anywhere in the world. These include open DNS resolver,
monlist NTP server, Windows CLDAP server, SSDP/uPnP
server, and more.
Additionally, [17] points out that 50% of new DDoS
attacks use User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood attacks
(TABLE 1).
The concern is that with 5G, a new advanced network, such
attacks will be faster and more damaging.
So why are the Distributed Reflection Denial of Ser-
vice (DrDoS) attacks through UDP favored by attackers? By
design, a UDP is a connectionless protocol that does not
validate source Internet Protocol (IP) addresses [18], [19].
Unless the application-layer protocol contains countermea-
sures, such as session initiation in the Voice over Internet
Protocol, an attacker can easily forge the IP packet datagram
(a basic transfer unit associated with a packet-switched net-
work) to include an arbitrary source IP address. While many
UDP packets impersonate its victim’s IP address, the desti-
nation server (or amplifier) responds to the victim instead of
TABLE 2. UDP protocols prone To DrDoS attacks and associated
BAFs [21].
the attacker – this creates a reflected denial-of-service (DoS)
attack [20]. Certain application-layer protocols that rely on
UDPs (e.g., DNS, NTP, SSDP) have been identified as poten-
tial attack vectors. In [21], we can refer all the UDP protocols
prone to Distributed Reflection Denial-of-Service (DrDoS)
attacks and associated BAFS(Bandwidth Amplification
Factors).
The BAF of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) DDoS can
reach up to 556.9 (as seen in TABLE 2). A significant DDoS
NTP reflection attack occurred on February 11, 2014. This
attack was reported to hit a record-breaking 400 Gbit/s (33%
larger than the previous year’s attack against Spamhaus). This
incident was one of the five most notable DDoS attacks in
history [23].
This paper uses the NTP DDoS as an example to explore
the defense against UDPDDoS attacks. Our contributions can
be summarized as follows.
1) The overall state of DDoS susceptibility is characterized
by analyzing nearly two years of DDoS attack reports.
2) Extant countermeasures to DDoS attacks are assessed
and shortcomings within them are defined.
3) A defense against DrDoS is proposed and its security is
verified.
4) A detailed comparison between the proposed scheme
and similar existing schemes is provided.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides background information about NTP protocols and
NTP DDoS Attacks. Section III introduces existing DDoS
attack countermeasures, four strategies from principle: packet
filtering, source-side control, source-side tracing, and router
dynamic monitoring and control. Section III also considers
four schemes to strengthen UDP protocols: Stateless Connec-
tions, Cookie, Falling-together, and client Puzzle. Section IV
proposes an authentication scheme to defend against UDP
DrDoS, reports and its implementation in the laboratory. The
security of the proposed scheme is analyzed by using the
stochastic model of semi-markov process. Section V provides
a further comparison between the proposed countermeasure
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and the four countermeasures introduced in Section III.
The evaluation parameters include communication overhead,
server computation costs, client computation costs, server
storage costs, and client storage costs. Section VI contains
a brief summary and conclusion.
II. MOTIVATIONS
The NTP is a networking protocol for clock synchronization
between computer systems over packet-switched, variable-
latency data networks. The NTP uses the UDP 123 port
for communication and is the most common way that
GNU/Linux software clocks are synchronized with the Inter-
net time server [24]. It is designed to mitigate the effects of
variable network latency, which can typically be kept within
tens of milliseconds on the public Internet. LAN accuracy is
even higher, at up to 1 ms 0 [25].
A. DrDoS ATTACKS
In 2012, there was a significant increase in the use of a
specific DDoS methodology known as Distributed Reflec-
tion Denial-of-Service (DrDoS). DrDoS techniques usually
involve multiple victim host machines that unwittingly par-
ticipate in a DDoS attack on the attacker’s primary tar-
get. Requests to the victim host machines are redirected
(or reflected) from the victim hosts to the target [26]. DrDoS
attacks have been a persistent and effective type of DDoS
attack for more than 10 years. The technique shows no signs
of subsiding; it continues to grow in effectiveness and popu-
larity among attackers.
Reflective DDoS attacks are favored by attackers for two
main reasons: first, attacks can be carried out by forging
addresses to hide the source of attacks, and second, most
reflection attacks carry amplification effects, which can mag-
nify attack traffic by tens or even hundreds of times. For
example, the average amplification factor of NTP DrDoS
attacks is 556.9 [21]. Protocols associated with reflective
attacks currently include NTP, Chargen, SSDP, DNS, RPC
portmap, and others.
DrDoS attacks are a type of DDoS attack. And the attacks
through UDP discussed in this article refer to DrDoS attacks.
B. A NTP DrDoS ATTACK
UDP-based NTP protocol can be abused to amplify DoS
attack traffic. The attacker uses spoofing source IP addresses
to generate a large number of UDP packets to the NTP
server’s port 123, saturating the target of the NTP reply.
Some NTP installations also support the MONLIST com-
mand, which is mainly used to monitor the NTP server.
When an NTP server responds to the MONLIST, it returns
the IP of the last 600 clients that have been synchronized
with the NTP server. The response packet is divided into 6
IP-groups that contain a maximum of 100 response packets.
In other words: only a small request packet needs to be sent to
trigger a large number of continuous UDP response packets
containing IP address information [27]. Consider a malicious
teenager calling a restaurant and saying, ‘‘I’ll have one of
FIGURE 1. NTP amplification attack (DDoS attack) diagram.
everything on the menu – please call me back and read back
my whole order.’’ When the restaurant asks for a callback
number, the prankster gives a target victim’s phone number.
The target then receives a call from the restaurant with a lot of
cumbersome, time-consuming information that they did not
request.
An NTP amplification attack can be broken down into four
steps:
1) The attacker uses a botnet to send UDP packets with
spoofed IP addresses to an NTP server, which has an enabled
MONLIST command. The spoofed IP address for each packet
points to the victim’s real IP address.
2) Each UDP packet makes a request to the NTP server
using its MONLIST command, resulting in a large response.
3) The server then spoofs the address with the resulting
data response.
4) The target IP address receives the response and the
surrounding network infrastructure is overwhelmed by a large
amount of traffic, resulting in denial of service.
The NTP amplification attack process is shown schemati-
cally in FIGURE 1.
The abuse of the MONLIST request is not new, but has
become particularly trendy in recent years.
III. RELATED WORK
There are many existing countermeasures against DDoS
attacks. In principle, there are four ways to deal with DoS
attacks: packet filtering, source-side control, source-side
traceability, and router dynamic monitoring and control.
Packet filtering [28] works by filtering, or discarding,
specific traffic to avoid attacks. The packet filtering scheme
needs the network administrator of each ISP to cooperate arti-
ficially. Thus, the work intensity is large and time-consuming
to implement, making the scheme altogether difficult to carry
out. Certain forms of source-side filtering can reduce or elim-
inate fake IP addresses. This may help to prevent DoS attacks,
and indeed, more and more routers now support source-side
filtering. However, source-side filtering does not completely
eliminate IP address impersonation. There are many ways
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to trace the source side of an attack. For example, extant
methods assume that there is a source of the address spoofing
(i.e., an attempt to suppress the attack at its source while
identifying said malicious source). Unfortunately, during the
actual tracing process, the harm caused by the attack cannot
be controlled in real time; furthermore, the attack cannot be
effectively traced when the source is scattered.
The main assumption of router dynamic monitoring and
control is that we can identify the flow aggregation through
the router by analyzing the packet loss history. If a router
recognizes high-bandwidth stream aggregates, it can ask the
upstream router sending the aggregates to limit its delivery
rate. However, whether this mechanism can be realized in an
actual network is uncertain due to issues such as monitoring
standards, fairnessmechanisms, and efficient implementation
or overall operation management problems.
The very high frequency, and increasingly high severity of
UDP DDoS attacks, suggest that defects in the UDP protocol
remain problematic. To resolve DDoS attacks at the root, it is
critically important to strengthen the UDP protocol. Current
methods taking this approach include stateless connection,
increasing expense, and weak authentication.
Stateless Connections methods can be used to solve DoS
problems by reducing the memory resource load of the
responder [29]. After receiving an initial request from the
initiator, the responder executes the protocol without saving
the status information related to the protocol; this is accom-
plished by sending status information to the initiator as part of
the response information. Then, the initiator returns the status
to the responder in the next message [30], [31]. Although this
method does not deplete memory resources, computational
resources are still affected. If confidentiality and integrity
of the state are required, the consumption of computational
resources will rapidly increase. Additionally, an attacker can
replay Msg3 to launch a replay attack.
The Falling-together method was established by Matsuura
and Imai [32]. It works by minimizing the number of calcu-
lations required by the responder. In this way, the number of
calculations required by the initiator is greater than or equal
to that of the responder when both parties have comparable
computing power [33]. When an attacker attempts a DoS
attack on a responder, the attacker may first run out of its own
computing resources before the responder runs out of com-
puting resources [34], [35]. The Falling-together approach
ensures the initiator and responder have a comparable com-
putation level, while the responder is stateless. This method
can only prevent a single-attacker DoS attack – it is rendered
ineffective by a DDoS or DrDoS.
Dwork and Naor developed the Proof of the Work con-
cept [36], while Jules and Brainard proposed the Client Puz-
zle method currently utilized by Aura [37]. In these methods,
when a request is received and agreed upon, the responder
does not save any state but rather asks a sponsor a password
problem, then waits for the sponsor to solve the problem to
continue the agreement [38]–[40]. The Client Puzzle method
is highly vulnerable to replay attacks. Additionally, setting
up sufficiently challenging password problems to ensure the
method’s efficacy can be difficult.
The basic working principle of the Cookie method is a
stateless weak authentication mechanism [41]. The initia-
tor initiates a request and receives a cookie (returned by
the responder) that may only be made or verified by the
responder. The initiator connects to the responder again and
provides the cookie, then the responder verifies whether the
cookie is correct. If the test is passed, the responder initially
believes that the initiator is not an attacker and begins to
provide resources for the operation of subsequent parts of the
agreement [42]. However, if an attacker uses a real IP address
to obtain the cookie, he can use the real IP address to launch
an attack.
As far as we know, our study is the only quantitative and
empirical study on UDP DDoS attacks thus far.
IV. IEWA SCHEME AND ANALYSIS
An IEWA scheme is a scheme that combines increasing
expense and weak authentication. In this part, the implemen-
tation process and rules of the IEWA scheme are introduced in
detail at first. Then, the correctness of the scheme is verified
in the laboratory (according to the comparison of experimen-
tal results without and with IEWA). Finally, the security of
the method is verified.
A. IEWA SCHEME
The IEWA scheme:
Step 1: (Initialization) Assume that no client has sent a
request to the server. The server defines all variables, includ-
ing the IP address of client i CIPi. The two hashes obtained
by md5 algorithm are Hi1 and Hi2. A random number SN j is
generated every 12 hours. Client i defines a variable H ′i2 that
stores a verification code.
Step 2: The server initializes SN j.
Step 3: client i makes a request to the server.
Step 4: The server computes the value of
Hi1(SN j||CIPi) (1)
and sends
SN j||Hi1(SN j||CIPi) (2)
to client i.
Step 5: client i computes
H ′i2(SN j||Hi1) (3)
and sends it (along with Request i1) to the server.
Step 6: The server computes the value of
Hi2(SN j||Hi1) (4)
and determines whether H ′i2 and Hi2 are equivalent. If H ′i2
equals Hi2, then the server satisfies the client i’s request,
otherwise, we go to Step 2.
A flow diagram depicting the IEWA algorithm flow when
the client sends the first request to the server within 12 hours
is shown in FIGURE 2.
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FIGURE 2. Algorithm flow of IEWA (when client i sends the first request
to the server within 12 hours).
FIGURE 3. Initial connection establishment in IEWA.
FIGURE 3 shows the first time a client sends a request
to and successfully establishes a connection with the
server. After that, if client i has a request and as long as the
value of c [i] is not greater than N, client i simply sends Hi2
(and the request) to the server without introducing additional
communication time.
B. IEWA SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION
We applied the IEWA scheme to the NTP protocol in our
laboratory to verify its security.
1) EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
When setting up the experimental environment, we used a
virtual machine as the NTP server: Windows 7 (64-bit) (Win-
dows 7 virtual machine under VMware 12 pro). The script
file was run under Ubuntu-12.04.5.
FIGURE 4. One request from 172.16.93.122 responded to 172.16.93.123
by 22 (without IEWA).
FIGURE 5. A request in which 172.16.93.122 sends to 172.16.93.123
(without IEWA).
2) RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
First, we simulated a NTP DrDoS attack in our labora-
tory. The experimental results are shown in FIGURE 4-6.
In FIGURE 4, client 172.16.93.122 initiated a request to NTP
server 172.16.93.123. Next, the server responded to the client
with 100 packets. We calculated the specific amplification
factor as follows: the client initiates a request using 50 bytes
(as shown in FIGURE 5) but 64 bytes are transmitted [43].
The server responds to the data packets with 410 bytes (as
shown in FIGURE 6) per packet and 100 data packets, send-
ing out a total of 41000 bytes; thus, the amplification factor
is 410 ∗ 100/64 = 641. In fact, the amount of data returned
by a MONLIST request is related to the number of clients
interacting with the NTP server over time. If the NTP server
interacts with a large number of clients, the attack traffic
amplification factor increases.
We ran an experimental verification of the IEWA scheme
according to the algorithm flow detailed in A of Section IV.
In the first iteration, we did not limit the quantity of
client requests (see FIGURE 7). We found that, although
client 172.16.93.122 did not pass the verification, server
172.16.93.122 did not respond. This suggested that there was
no DrDoS attack; but, in reality, as the client initiated the
request, the server was too busy to consider the reasonable
request to be normal and a DoS attack did occur.
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FIGURE 6. A response in which 172.16.93.123 replies to 172.16.93.122
(without IEWA).
FIGURE 7. Unlimited quantity of requests from 172.16.93.122 to
172.16.93.123 (with IEWA).
Conversely, when we limited the number of client requests
to N = 10 in a minute (see FIGURE 8), although the client
made continuous service requests to the server, it did not
constitute a DoS attack. The IEWA scheme in this case suc-
cessfully resisted both the DrDoS attack and DoS attack.
C. SECURITY PROOF
Reference [44] indicated that the safety evaluation index is
not absolute. For different network systems, people are inter-
ested in different evaluation indicators; therefore, attributes in
some specific systems do not need to be involved. For DDoS
attacks discussed in this article, we did not find it necessary
to analyze the confidentiality and integrity of the system.
In contrast, people are more concerned about the steady-state
FIGURE 8. Requests from 172.16.93.122 to 172.16.93.123 while Number of
requests limited to 10 in a minute (with IEWA).
FIGURE 9. Network system state under DDoS attack.
availability of the system. Therefore, the security analysis in
this paper mainly analyzes the steady-state availability after
using the IEWA protocol.
A stochastic model based on state can analyze a network
system under attack given the transfer relationship between
the distributed states, the original states, and applications
based on the original states. In the Angle of attack method,
the network attack model ignores unknown details that do
not affect the safety evaluation index. In addition, unknown
attacks can be described and recognized from the perspective
of the attack influence [44].
As described in [45] and [46], the process of the network
system under attack (by DDoS) is characterized by four states
{G,A,TR,F} (see FIGURE 9). If the TR state is entered,
the server may recover, fail, or enter an alert state. In the
alert state, the user can either manually restore the server or
the server fails. A chance of recovery remains after a server
failure, but the server is far less alert and is not in a state where
it can counteract or respond to an attack.
The security quantitative analysis method is based on
Semi-Markov Process (SMP). SMP is adopted to analyze the
security of our IEWA. Model parameters include the tran-
sition probability matrix Pij (i, j ∈ {G,A,TR,F}) between
states and the average residence time h = (hG, hA, hTR, hF )
of states. The discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) [47] cor-
responding to FIGURE 9 is shown in FIGURE 10. First, the
probability distribution of the stable state, of the discrete-
timeMarkov chain v = (vG, vA, vTR, vF ), is calculated. Then,
the steady state probability of the Semi-Markov Process
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FIGURE 10. DTMC process under DDoS attack.
model can be expressed as:
pii = vihi∑
j vjhj
, i, j ∈ {G,A,TR,F} (5)
The steady-state availability of the system is defined as:
As = 1− piF (6)
According to FIGURE 10, the state transition formula of
DTMC in DDoS attack
vG = pGvG + pAvA + 15 (1− pTR) vTR + (1− pF ) vF (7)
vTR = (1− pG)vG (8)
vA = 45(1− pTR)vTR (9)
vF = pTRvTR + pFvF + (1− pA)vA (10)
The following is the numerical analysis of the security
indicators for the original NTP protocol, the improved IEWA
protocol and of the initialization of the model parameter
values.
The state transition probability P: pG is defined when the
model is at a normal service state G or the attack failuremodel
remains in server state. The parameter pA is the probability
of successful alarm, pTR is the probability of responding to
an attack, and pF is the probability of a successful attack.
Before NTP protocol improvement, we set pG = 0.9, pA =
0.1, pTR = 0.12, pF = 0.2. After improving the protocol,
there is an authentication stage in the IEWA protocol. At this
stage, the attack difficulty is upgraded, so pF = 0.001 after
improving the protocol.
The average residence time hi: is determined by the ran-
dom time that state i completes the corresponding interac-
tion process (according to the protocol). In the SMP model
of this paper, the residence time of the four states satis-
fies the exponential distribution and each time unit is 1.
Before implementing the improvement of the NTP protocol,
hG = hF = hA = 0.5. Since the attack response state time
will be long, hTR = 1.
After the protocol is improved, the average residence time
of the authentication phase is increased, so set hG = 1.
With IEWA, the attacker can’t implement a DrDoS attack,
the attack may be downgraded to a DoS attack. While,
the DoS attack needs to be implemented before the other
attack to defraud the server authentication, e.g., Man-in-the-
middle attack. However, to carry out a man-in-the-middle
attack, ARP spoofing is often necessary. Thus, to imple-
ment this attack, the difficulty of the DoS attack must
increase greatly, which also consumes a lot of time. There-
fore, the attack response time is greatly extended. The hTR
parameter adds verification time, ARP spoofing time, and
man-in-the-middle attack time to the original protocol. There-
fore, we set hTR = 4.
According to the parameters and eqs. (5-10) described in
this section:
The original protocol:
vG = 0.79, vA = 0.056, vTR = 0.084, vF = 0.074,
piF = 0.07, As = 0.93
Protocol with IEWA:
vG = 0.55, vA = 0.039, vTR = 0.055, vF = 0.041,
piF = 0.02, As = 0.98
After the protocol is improved, the steady-state availability
of the system increases from 0.93 to 0.98, indicating that the
IEWA scheme proposed in this paper has a higher steady-state
availability than the original NTP protocol under analysis (via
the random model based on the semi-Markov process).
V. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
We simulated NTP (adds IEWA before and after) DrDoS
attacks in our laboratory and verified the effectiveness of the
proposed IEWA scheme in section IV. Then, we compared the
four countermeasures mentioned in the Related Work section
with IEWA scheme in terms of communication overhead,
server computation costs, client computation costs, server
storage costs, and client storage costs. In TABLE 3-(a) and
TABLE 3-(b), Co, Scc, Ccc, Ssc, Csc stand for commu-
nication overhead, server computation costs, client compu-
tation costs, server storage costs, and client storage costs,
respectively.
A. COMPARISON
Original protocols have 2N communication overhead when
the client initiates N requests. The co-rows of TABLE 3-(a)
and TABLE 3-(b) show that, when compared to the original
protocol, if the client makes N requests, the IEWA scheme
adds two session times. Alternatively, the other four schemes
all add 2N requests. In this regard, IEWA scheme outperforms
the others.
Row Ccc shows the Computation cost to the client. Next,
we verify if the server and the client have communicated
N times. In an IEWA scheme request, the client needs a
hash function to begin calculations. The Stateless Connec-
tions and Failing-together methods require several compu-
tation iterations (N-times Encryption, N-times Decryption
and N-times Encryption, N-times Decryption, N times Hash,
respectively). The Client Puzzle method needs an N-times
PHC puzzle solution, while the cookies method does not
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TABLE 3. (a) Communication overhead of N client requests to Server.
(b) Communication overhead of N client requests to Server.
require any computation from the client. The key point of
a DoS attack is to consume a huge amount of the target’s
computational resources with low cost [48]. So increasing the
cost of launching a DrDoS attack properly may reduce the
likelihood of launching an attack. So the IEWA scheme is a
more appropriate choice in this respect.
The key to server storage cost-efficiency in the Cookie
method is maintaining at least 64 bits of encryption
strength [49], but the secret length of a Cookie is uncertain.
Therefore, the server storage costs of the Cookie method
is: 64 + an uncertain length (unknown). Ns is 64-bits +
length(b), but the length of b is uncertain, so the server
storage costs of the Client Puzzle method is 64 + length(b).
If b is more than 8 bits, the PHC problem is unanswerable.
The Falling-together and Stateless Connection methods both
use the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. Thus, the default secret
key length is 1024. Therefore, the server storage costs of
the Falling-together and Stateless Connection method are,
respectively, 1024 ∗ 3 = 3072bits and 1024 ∗ 5 = 5120 bits.
The server storage costs of IEWA are Length
(
SN j
) = 64
bits. Thus, IEWA outperforms the other methods.
The client storage costs of IEWA are 128 bits. The
Stateless Connections are 3072 bits. The Cookie are
288 bits (context is minimum at 128 bits and Cookie
uses the MD5 algorithm). The Falling-together method has
4094 bits. The Client Puzzle method has none. Therefore,
the storage requirements of the client are moderate for
IEWA scheme.
B. ANALYSIS
First, we find that the steady-state availability of the system
has been improved by 5 percent. This is based on analysis of
the Security Proof.
Second, as shown in FIGURE 3, communication over-
head with the IEWA assumes that the client requests to the
server only occur one N at a time. Only at the first request,
two communications are added, including the server sending
the random number, the hash function value of the random
number and the client IP to the client and the client sending
the request and verification code to the server. For other
N-1 requests, the client just attaches the verification code to
the request to initiate requests without an increase in commu-
nication time (That is to say two communications are added
when the client issues N requests to the server). Therefore,
the increased communication overhead does not break the
lightweight nature of the UDP protocol.
As we have shown, the computational cost of the client and
the server includes the calculation of the hash function, which
is only added to the client once and to the server twice (this
is based on the client’s original protocol). Additionally, from
the storage cost analysis of the client and server, compared to
the original protocol, the server and the client have increased
64 bits and 128 bits respectively. For a vulnerable protocol
like NTP, too much or too little computation and storage on
the client side is not good, because too much computational
and storage cost reduces the availability of NTP, while too
little reduces the cost of launching a DrDoS attack. So our
scheme does not affect the availability of an NTP protocol,
but increases the cost of launching a DrDoS attack.
Based on the analysis in this section, the availability of
NTP is not affected by IEWA. Similarly, as with IEWA,
the other UDP protocols are not vulnerable to DrDoS attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
5G not only brings high speed and low latency online experi-
ence to everyday network users, but also provides a faster and
more convenient attack channel for UDPDrDoS attacks. That
is to say, in a 5G network, UDP-based DrDoS will become
more and more dangerous. In the face of 5G, the abuse of
UDP for amplification Denial of Attack is a threat that needs
to be mitigated urgently.
UDP flooding can be deployed for DrDoS attack has
advantages in terms security by which a large number of UDP
packets are sent to a target server in order to overwhelm the
device’s processing capability and responsiveness. The UDP
protocols are vulnerable to DrDoS attacks because spoofing a
UDP packet is easier than spoofing a TCP packet [50]. AUDP
does not establish an initial connection (also known as a hand-
shake) because there is no virtual connection between the two
communicating systems. Thus, the services associated with
UDP are under serious threats of attacks. Therefore, all UDP
protocols listed in TABLE 2 are vulnerable to DrDoS attacks
for similar reasons.
In this study, we design IEWA scheme for NTP. We ana-
lyzed and compared five defense countermeasures in terms of
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security, communication overhead, server computation costs,
client computation costs, server storage costs, and client stor-
age costs. The proposed IEWA scheme has advantages in
terms of security, communication load, server storage costs,
and client computation costs. The method also performs
well on all the metrics we tested. Security, communication
and computation overheads are important aspects of network
communication. Thus, IEWA is a feasible countermeasure to
NTP DrDoS attacks. With IEWA, we can strengthen other
UDP protocols that are prone to DrDoS attacks.
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